Home | Legal Advice | Judgment | Sandeep Yadav Versus Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench At Lucknow And 6 Others [2022

Sandeep Yadav Versus Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench At Lucknow And 6 Others [2022

By Shivendra Pratap Singh
Estimated Reading Time:

We do not find any good reason to by-pass the statutory alternative remedy provided under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. The writ petition is dismissed on the ground of statutory alternative remedy available to the petitioner leaving it open for the petitioner to file an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. Sandeep Yadav Versus Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench At Lucknow And 6 Others [WRIT – A No. – 19332 of 2021].

Judgment

1. The present writ petition is filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 28th October, 2021 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal (RB), Lucknow in Original Application No.208 of 2017, Sandeep Yadav Vs. Union of India and others. The petitioner has further challenged discharge/dismissal order dated 7th March, 2017 passed by respondent no.5 and order dated 10th January, 2017 passed by the Director General Recruiting/Recruiting B AG’s Branch, Integrated Head Quarter of Ministry of Defence (Army), New Delhi.

2. The brief facts of the case arising in the present writ petition are that the petitioner was enrolled in the Army on 4th June, 2014 and he underwent basic military training at The Parachute Regimental Training Centre w.e.f. 4th August, 2014. On completion of basic military training, he was sent to Maratha Light Regimental Centre for technical training of Clerk (Staff Duties) which commenced on 22nd December, 2014. However, the petitioner failed in midterm test and was relegated thrice in terms of policy letter dated 6th January, 1995 and 10th April, 1996. According to aforesaid policy, a recruit who could not pass even after relegating and three months detention, should be re-mustered or discharged from service. The petitioner failed in final test on 9th February, 2016 and was returned to the Parachute Regimental Centre. Petitioner made a request for change of his trade from Clerk (Staff Duties) to Soldier Tradesman (Dresser) vide personal application dated 31st March, 2016. Accordingly, a case was taken up with Ministry of Defence (Infantry-6) and his case was turned down on the ground that his height was 06 cms short to become a soldier tradesman. A show cause notice dated 25th January, 2017 was served upon the petitioner to which he replied on 13th February, 2017 and after receipt of reply he was discharged from service w.e.f. 7th March, 2017 under Rule 13(3)(iv) of Army Rules, 1954 on the ground of ‘Unlikely to become a soldier’.

3. The petitioner thereafter, preferred Original Application No.208 of 2017 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow with the following prayers:-

“i. That this Hon’ble Tribunal may kindly be pleased and directed to the opp. Parties to quash the dismissal/discharge order dated 7-3-2017 and letter No.62518/Rangroot B(A) dated 10.01.2017 or any adverse order which was passed by the opposite parties after summoning the same during the pendency of the case & pay salary with consequential benefits etc. to the petitioner.

ii. That this Hon’ble Tribunal may kindly be pleased to to pass any other order or directions which is deem just & proper in favour of the petitioner.”

4. The above mentioned original application was contested by the respondents before the Tribunal below and the Tribunal below by impugned judgment dated 28th October, 2021 has dismissed the above mentioned original application of the petitioner.

5. It is the impugned order dated 28th October, 2021 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow, which is subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition.

6. Sri Arvind Nath Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents has at the very outset raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the petitioner has a statutory alternative remedy of filing an appeal under Sections 30 and 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act No.55 of 2007”) and in view of the aforesaid, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. In this reference, Shri Arvind Nath Agrawal has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs Major General Shri Kant Sharma and others, reported in 2015 (6) SCC 773 and judgment dated 1st November, 2021 passed by this Court in Writ-A No 15281 of 2021 – Ex-Hav Clerk (Stores) Ram Naresh Ram Vs Union of India and others to contend that the present writ petition is not liable to be entertained on the ground of alternative remedy of filing an appeal.

7. Confronted with the aforesaid preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents, counsel for the petitioner has submitted that although there is an alternative remedy under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act of 2007, by way of preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, on account of the poor financial condition of the petitioner, the aforesaid remedy would not be efficacious in the facts and circumstances of the case and as such, the writ petition is liable to be entertained. Further, the counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the order dated 5th January, 2021 passed in Service Bench No.26242 of 2020, annexure 16 and order dated 8th December, 2015 in Service Single No.6239 of 2015, annexure 17 to the writ petition to contend that on previous occasions in similar facts and circumstances, the writ petition has been entertained by this Court.

8. The Act No. 55 of 2007 has been enacted to provide for the adjudication or trial by the Armed Forces Tribunal of disputes and complaints with respect to commission, appointments, enrolment and conditions of service in respect of persons subject to the Army Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force Act, 1950 and also to provide for appeals arising out of orders, findings or sentences of court martial held under the said Acts and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

9. The aforesaid Act No. 55 of 2007 under Section 4 provides for establishment of Armed Forces Tribunal to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on it by or under this Act. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been provided under Section 14 of the Act No. 55 of 2007. Section 14 provides that a person aggrieved by an order pertaining to any service matter may make an application to the Tribunal in relation to all service matters. Under Section 14(4) of the Act, the Tribunal is vested with the same powers as with the civil court while trying a suit in respect of matters enumerated under Section 14(4). It is further to be seen that the Tribunal is the authority under the aforesaid Act to decide both the questions of law and facts as may be raised before it.

10. The provisions of appeal under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act of 2007 is provided against an order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal to the Supreme Court. It is not in dispute between the parties that the remedy of appeal is provided under the Act against the impugned order dated 27th August, 2021 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow. Further, Section 33 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act provides for exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court.

11. It is trite of law that the power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution to exercise judicial superintendents over the decision of all Courts and Tribunals within the respective jurisdiction is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Broadly speaking, judicial review in India comprises three aspects: judicial review of legislative action, judicial review of judicial decisions and judicial review of administrative action. The present case pertains to judicial review of judicial decisions.

12. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary and discretionary in nature. It is also to be noted that the powers to be exercised by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are constitutional powers and the same cannot be excluded by legislation. The Armed Forces Tribunal Act cannot curtail the powers under the grand-norm being the constitution. The legislations under the constitutional framework is required to be in consonance with the scheme of the Constitution specially the scheme of judicial review provided in the Constitution under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution.

13. The Full Bench of this Court in Mahesh Chand Ex-LNK/CI Vs Union of India (supra) in paragraph 71 has held as follows:-

“(i) Our jurisprudence in over six decades since the adoption of the Constitution has evolved a clear, categoric and unambiguous recognition of the importance of judicial review by the Supreme Court under Article 32 and by the High Courts under Article 226. Judicial review is an indispensable safeguard to the preservation of liberty, freedom and to the realization of rights founded on the rule of law. Without constitutionally entrenched remedies, the realisation of fundamental constitutional rights would be illusory or, as Dr B R Ambedkar described it, a mere ‘pious declaration’: “It is the remedy that makes a right real. If there is no remedy, there is no right of all, and I am therefore not prepared to burden the Constitution with a number of pious declarations which may sound as glittering generalities but for which the Constitution makes no provision by way of a remedy. It is much better to be limited in the scope of our rights and to make them real by enunciating remedies than to have a lot of pious wishes embodied in the Constitution. I am very glad that this House has seen that the remedies that we have provided constitute a fundamental part of this Constitution…”50

(ii) The power of judicial review of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts is firmly entrenched as a basic feature of the Constitution which lies beyond the amending power. Even more so, ordinary legislation cannot abrogate the constitutional power of judicial review that is vested in the Supreme Court under Article 32 and in the High Courts under Article 226;

(iii) The Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 does not contain, either expressly or by necessary implication, any exclusion of the power of judicial review that is conferred upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 or upon the High Courts under Article 226. The legislation in fact contains a statutory recognition in Section 14 that the jurisdiction which is conferred upon the Armed Forces Tribunal is a jurisdiction in relation to service matters as defined in Section 3(o) as was exercisable by all courts and tribunals immediately before the appointed day, save and except the jurisdiction exercisable by the Supreme Court and the High Courts;

(iv) Having said this, it needs to be emphasised that the existence of jurisdiction and the nature of its exercise have distinct connotations in constitutional law. The Armed Forces Tribunal is constituted by legislation which provides for a specialized and efficacious administration of justice in matters falling within its jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act. This is coupled with the need to maintain discipline in the Armed Forces;

(v) The Armed Forces Tribunal is a court of first instance and ordinarily, matters which fall within the purview of its jurisdiction have to proceed for adjudication before the Tribunal and the Tribunal alone. Against the decision of the Tribunal, there is a statutory remedy of an appeal which is provided under Sections 30 and 31 to the Supreme Court;

(vi) Since a statutory remedy of an appeal is provided, the principles which are well established for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226, would warrant that the High Court should be circumspect and careful while determining as to whether any case for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is made out;

(vii) The jurisdiction under Article 226 has not been abrogated as it could not have been, being a basic and essential feature of the Constitution.”

14. The Apex Court in Union of India v. Major General Shri Kant Sharma and another, (2015) 6 SCC 773 has held as under:-

“The aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court can be summarised as follows:

(i) The power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 is one of the basic essential features of the Constitution and any legislation including the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 cannot override or curtail jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.(Refer: L. Chandra Kumar [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] and S.N. Mukherjee [(1990) 4 SCC 594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669] .)

(ii) The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 32 though cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of any enactment, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. (Refer: Mafatlal Industries Ltd. [(1997) 5 SCC 536] )

(iii) When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. (Refer:Nivedita Sharma [(2011) 14 SCC 337 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 947] .)

(iv) The High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. (Refer: Nivedita Sharma [(2011) 14 SCC 337 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 947].)”

15. The Apex Court in Union of India v. Major General Shri Kant Sharma (supra) has highlighted the anomalous situation that will be created in case the statutory alternative remedy is permitted to be bypassed. In this reference, attention is drawn to paragraph 43 and 44 of Union of India v. Major General Shri Kant Sharma (supra):-

“Section 30 provides for an appeal to this Court subject to leave granted under Section 31 of the Act. By clause (2) of Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 has been excluded in relation to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. If any person aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, moves the High Court under Article 226 and the High Court entertains the petition and passes a judgment or order, the person who may be aggrieved against both the orders passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal and the High Court, cannot challenge both the orders in one joint appeal. The aggrieved person may file leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution against the judgment passed by the High Court but in view of the bar of jurisdiction by clause (2) of Article 136, this Court cannot entertain appeal against the order of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Once, the High Court entertains a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Armed Forces Tribunal and decides the matter, the person who thus approached the High Court, will also be precluded from filing an appeal under Section 30 with leave to appeal under Section 31 of the Act against the order of the Armed Forces Tribunal as he cannot challenge the order passed by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under Section 30 read with Section 31 of the Act. Thereby, there is a chance of anomalous situation. Therefore, it is always desirable for the High Court to act in terms of the law laid down by this Court as referred to above, which is binding on the High Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, allowing the aggrieved person to avail the remedy under Section 30 read with Section 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act.

The High Court (the Delhi High Court) while entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution bypassed the machinery created under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act. However, we find that the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Allahabad High Court had not entertained the petitions under Article 226 and directed the writ petitioners to seek resort under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act. Further, the law laid down by this Court, as referred to above, being binding on the High Court, we are of the view that the Delhi High Court was not justified in entertaining the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

16. The Apex Court in Balkrishna Ram Vs Union of India (supra) has held as under:-

“1. Leave granted. One of the issues raised in this appeal is whether an appeal against an order of a Single Judge of a High Court deciding a case related to an Armed Forces personnel pending before the High Court is required to be transferred to the Armed Forces Tribunal or should be heard by the High Court.

14. It would be pertinent to add that the principle that the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when an efficacious alternative remedy is available, is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law. The writ courts normally refrain from exercising their extraordinary power if the petitioner has an alternative efficacious remedy. The existence of such remedy however does not mean that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted. At the same time, it is a well settled principle that such jurisdiction should not be exercised when there is an alternative remedy available [Union of India v. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882]. The rule of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not a rule of jurisdiction. Merely because the Court may not exercise its discretion, is not a ground to hold that it has no jurisdiction. There may be cases where the High Court would be justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction because of some glaring illegality committed by AFT. One must also remember that the alternative remedy must be efficacious and in case of a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), or a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO); to expect such a person to approach the Supreme Court in every case may not be justified. It is extremely difficult and beyond the monetary reach of an ordinary litigant to approach the Supreme Court. Therefore, it will be for the High Court to decide in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case whether it should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction or not. There cannot be a blanket ban on the exercise of such jurisdiction because that would effectively mean that the writ court is denuded of its jurisdiction to entertain such writ petitions which is not the law laid down in L. Chandra Kumar (supra).”

17. It is further to be seen that the controversy involved before the Apex Court in the matter of Balkrishna Ram Vs Union of India and another (supra) was whether an appeal against an order of Single Judge of High Court deciding a case related to an Armed Forces personnel pending before the High Court is required to be transferred to the Armed Forces Tribunal or should be heard by the High Court.

18. A Division Bench of this Court in Writ- A No 15281 of 2021 by order dated 1st November, 2021 has considered a similar issue and held as under:-

“5. The judgment in the case of Balkrishna Ram (supra) and judgment in the case of Major General Shri Kant Sharma (supra) both were rendered by Division Benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the case of Major General Shri Kant Sharma (supra) the question consdiered by Hon’ble Supreme Court was as under :

“Whether the right of appeal under Section 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 against an order of Armed Forces Tribunal with the leave of the Tribunal under Section 31 of the Act or leave granted by the Supreme Court, or bar of leave to appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 136(2) of the Constitution of India, will bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India regarding matters related to Armed Forces.?”

6. The aforesaid question was specifically answered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforequoted paragraphs 37, 38, 39 of the judgment.

7. The controversy involved before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balkrishna Ram (supra) is reflected from the paragraph 2 of the aforequoted paragraph of the judgment which indicates that the question involved was “whether an appeal against an order of a single judge of a High Court deciding a case related to an Armed Forces personnel pending before the High Court is required to be transferred to the Armed Forces Tribunal or should be heard by the High Court. ?”

8. The question so framed was answered by Hon’ble Supreme Court with the observations made in paragraph 14 as aforequoted and ultimately the appeal was dismissed with the observations made in paragraph 19 of the judgment.

9. The question with respect to the interpretation of Section 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 was directly and essentially in issue and consideration by Hon’ble Supreme Court Union of India & Ors. Vs. Major General Shri Kant Sharma & Anr (supra) and it was held that no person has a right of appeal against the final order or decision of the Tribunal to the Supreme Court other than those falling under Section 30(2) of the Act, but it is statutory appeal which lies to the Supreme Court. Thus, against the impugned order the petitioner has a right of appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court under under Section 30 read with Section 31 of the Act. The judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balkrishna Ram (supra) reiterates the well settled principle of law with regard to the extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

19. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for judicial review of the order of the tribunal below is not curtailed or restricted in any manner. The remedy provided under Article 226 of the Constitution is a extraordinary and discretionary remedy.

20. It would be pertinent to add that the principle that the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when an efficacious alternative remedy is available, is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law. The writ courts normally refrain from exercising their extraordinary power if the petitioner has an alternative efficacious remedy. The existence of such remedy however does not mean that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted. At the same time, it is a well settled principle that such jurisdiction should not be exercised when there is an alternative remedy available. The rule of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not a rule of jurisdiction. Merely because the Court may not exercise its discretion, is not a ground to hold that it has no jurisdiction.

21. It is further to be seen that from the decisions stated herein above, it is clear that the judicial review is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not denuded of its power of judicial review in view of Armed Forces Tribunal Act. The power of the High Court under Article 226 is discretionary and extraordinary and is to exercise with great caution. The exercise of the powers of judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution is to be exercised by objective assessment of the plea of the petitioner that the statutory forum provided under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act is not efficacious remedy in the facts and circumstances of the case.

22. It is the case of the petitioner that although there is an alternative remedy of filing an appeal under Sections 30 and 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 before the Apex Court. However, the petitioner has approached under Article 226 of the Constitution as the remedy provided by way of appeal under Sections 30 and 31 of the aforesaid Act is not efficacious for the petitioner on account of financial disability of petitioner who is not in a position to afford the expenses of litigation and the fees of the Advocates at the Supreme Court which is also very exorbitant.

23. The petitioner on the basis of his poor financial condition has sought intervention of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution against the impugned order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal.

24. The pleadings are the foundation of litigation. In pleadings, the necessary and relevant particulars and material must be included and unnecessary and irrelevant material must be excluded. Pleadings in a particular case are the factual foundation on which the case of the litigant is based on. The pleadings should be specific in the petition and should disclose the complete cause of action for approaching the court. In case where the petitioner is praying for intervention of this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution by passing the statutory alternate remedy, it is the duty of the petitioner to bring complete facts and circumstances by way of pleadings in the writ petition as to why the remedy of appeal (statutory alternative remedy) is not an efficacious remedy in the facts and circumstances of the case. If the factual foundation for the cause of action in approaching the court is missing or is vague, then it is always open for the court to deny the relief to the petitioner/litigant in the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

25. In the present case, the factual foundation with regard to the remedy of appeal being not efficacious is pleaded in paragraph 23 of the writ petition and the same is quoted hereinbelow :-

“That, petitioner belongs to poor labourer family and having responsibilities of earning bread and butter for his entire family members including old ailing parents and has been discharged from Army service and is unable to afford the expenses of Hon’ble Apex Court to challenge the impugned order dated 28.10.2021 passed by respondent no.1 as advocates of Hon’ble Supreme Court are very expensive, hence left with no options filling the same before this Hon’ble court and this Hon’ble court is having jurisdiction to entertain the same as per power vested under Article 226 of Constitution of India.”

26. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraph 23 of the writ petition would demonstrate that except for the bald statement with regard to poor financial condition of the petitioner, there is nothing on record to demonstrate the poor financial condition of the petitioner. Further, the petitioner has also alleged that the Advocates in the Supreme Court are very expensive and as such he is not in a position to engage the aforesaid Advocates and bear the litigation expenses.

27. The submission of the petitioner that he is not in a position to prefer an appeal before the Supreme Court on account of his pity condition further cannot be accepted as the Parliament has promulgated Legal Service Authority Act, 1987 to constitute legal services authorities to provide free and competent legal services to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. Section 12 of the Legal Service Authority Act, 1987 enlist the sections of the society who are entitled to free legal services. In furtherance thereof, Supreme Court Legal Services Committee has been constituted to provide legal aid and assistance to the marginalized and weaker sections of the Society.

28. Apart from the aforesaid, the Apex Court has also constituted a scheme known as “Supreme Court Middle Income Group Legal Aid Scheme” to provide legal services to the middle income group citizens. The scheme is applicable to cases intended to be filed before the Supreme Court. The aforesaid scheme has been constituted under the aegis of Supreme Court Middle Income Group Legal Aid Society of which the Chief Justice of India is the patron-in-Chief.

29. The aforesaid Act of 1987 and the Scheme for Middle-Income Group are necessitated in furtherance of Article 39A of the Constitution that provides the State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.

30. The Government and the Supreme Court has constituted channels for free legal service to all the persons who are not in a position to access justice on account of their weak financial position and as such, the citizens are entitled to take the benefit of the aforesaid free legal service where a person finds himself not in a position to approach the court on account of his financial position.

31. It is also to be seen that once various avenues for providing free legal aid has been set up at the Supreme Court in order to enable the litigant to secure justice and that his distressed financial position may not come in the way of his securing justice and the justice is not denied to the litigant by reason of his economic disability, we do not find any reason to entertain the present writ petition under extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The economic disability of a litigant has been addressed by the Apex Court by constitution of Supreme Court Legal Service Committee and Supreme Court Middle Income Group Legal Aid Scheme. Once the channels for addressing the economic disability of the litigant has been set up by the Apex Court and the litigants have been provided fair opportunity to secure justice by providing free legal aid under the various scheme and the Act of 1987, the financial/economic disability may not be a ground for by-passing the statutory alternative remedy provided under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. The economic disability of a litigant has already been addressed and the institutional framework for securing justice to litigants having economic disability have already been put in place. It is always open for the petitioner to approach the aforesaid mechanisms to secure justice and to prefer appeal before the Supreme Court. The question that the remedy provided under the statute by way of appeal before the Apex Court, being not efficacious on the ground of economic disability, is not permissible unless the mechanisms under the Legal Service Authority Act, 1987 and the Supreme Court Middle Income Group Legal Aid Scheme has been approached and exercised by the petitioner in the case of economic disability.

32. In the result, we do not find any good reason to by-pass the statutory alternative remedy provided under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. The writ petition is dismissed on the ground of statutory alternative remedy available to the petitioner leaving it open for the petitioner to file an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.

~

Privacy Protection

Under privacy protection, we don’t publish your questions on the website. We keep your question confidential and protected by password.

shivendra pratap singh advocate

Shivendra Pratap Singh

Advocate

Practising lawyer at the High Court Lucknow. Expertise in Criminal, Civil, Matrimonial, Writ, Service matters, Property, Revenue and RERA related issues.

Kanoonirai has been advising in legal issues since October 2014. You can consult a lawyer through online media, telephonic consultation and video conferencing.

Contact

mail[at]kanoonirai.com
+91-91400-4[nine][six]54